What’s in a Name? Forging Common Ground on Abortion with Clarity of Definition

The impact of the Dobbs decision has left significant confusion and disagreement among healthcare providers, legislators, and others about precisely what clinical procedures are legally permitted and prohibited in states that now outlaw abortion. While some disagreement is certainly due to value differences, we argue that much of it is due to different definitions of the term “abortion”. Post-Dobbs, these differences are no longer theoretical; they affect patient care by delaying life-saving pregnancy termination procedures that could be considered illegal under broad prohibitions.

We see at least six different definitions being used in public, private, and academic conversations on this topic, including clinical, feminist, legal, political, popular, and theological definitions. For example, while inducing labor for chorioamnionitis at 17 weeks might be abortion clinically or legally, it would not under many theological definitions.

In this panel, professionals from four disciplines will discuss definitions of abortion: an obstetrician will discuss the medical definition; an attorney and bioethicist will discuss the legal definition; a Catholic ethicist will discuss religious perspectives; and a feminist scholar will discuss feminist interpretations. We will explore the areas of difference and agreement among these definitions, and demonstrate how these differences are largely semantic, rather than substantive.

We argue that clarity around definitions would increase agreement around the moral and legal permissibility of specific procedures and alleviate significant distress among healthcare providers treating people with severe and life-threatening conditions who require pregnancy termination. More agreement would temper rhetoric, even if significant disagreement still exists due to value differences.