Moral Testimony Pessimism and Clinical Ethics Consultation
Thursday, October 12, 2023
4:00 PM – 5:15 PM ET
Location: Atlantic (Third Floor)
Some philosophers have investigated the question of whether moral knowledge can be effectively and responsibly passed from one agent to another. On one side of the debate, moral testimony pessimists argue that there is something unacceptable about forming moral beliefs by deferring solely to the testimony of others. One proposed explanation of this pessimism is that moral testimony is problematic because it allows an agent to pass moral responsibility for a belief onto the authority to whom she deferred. If an agent can pass on moral responsibility, her ability to make moral improvement and her motivation to hold morally correct beliefs and perform morally good acts may become diminished.
The application of the moral testimony framework to clinical ethics consultation (CEC) has potential implications for structuring the goals of consultation and ethics education. If the pessimist is correct, then CEC runs the risk of permitting those who receive advice to punt responsibility for their actions stemming from that advice to the consultant. Not only might this have potential legal implications for CEC services, but it might also discourage those receiving consultation from engaging with morally relevant values and principles. If the pessimist is wrong, then there is minimal concern with deferring to the testimony of the consultant, even in curbside consultation contexts. That said, in order to effectively motivate ethical practice in healthcare institutions, ethicists need to consider the implications of the problem of pessimism for their daily practices.
Emily Slome – Philosophy – University of Colorado Boulder