The Ethics of Paternalism: Bringing Parenthood Back Into the Conversation
Friday, October 13, 2023
8:00 AM – 9:15 AM ET
Location: Atlantic (Third Floor)
There is strikingly little dialogue between philosophers and bioethicists writing about paternalism and those writing about parenthood. This lack of interaction is unfortunate, as the literature on parenthood contains rich accounts of the nature and sources of parental rights, including the right to decide for one’s child in her best interest—that is, to treat one’s child paternalistically. If there is any substantive relationship between the ethics of parental paternalism and paternalism more broadly, as seems plausible, then bringing these groups into conversation is critical. Meanwhile, leading theories of paternalism in bioethics give a central role to the notion of autonomy. One might think such theories are congruent with a plausible view of parental paternalism, since children notoriously have underdeveloped capacities for self-governance and limited autonomy rights. However, they face a major challenge: if parental paternalism is justified in virtue of childrens' limited autonomy, then it should be permissible for any adult to treat any child paternalistically, and that is not so. In this talk, I defend a novel account of paternalism that draws on insights from the philosophy of parenthood. Specifically, I defend the Priority View, which says it is permissible to treat someone paternalistically when and because they have a claim to your aid that overrides their right against your interference. The Priority View not only overcomes the challenges that face autonomy-based theories of paternalism, but reveals how relationships—especially relationships of dependency—can affect our rights. I close by discussing the Priority View's implications for medicine, research, and public health.