Kidd and Carel (2019) argue that the concept of epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007) is a “powerful tool” for analyzing injustice in healthcare settings: it not only helps us to identify the practices and biases that lead to these injustices; it also helps us discover ways to remedy them. Despite the intuitive appeal of their approach, however, I will question the value of framing encounters between healthcare providers and patients through the lens of this particular concept. To this end, I will discuss several arguments Kidd and Carel make regarding epistemic injustice, specifically testimonial injustice, in healthcare. Broadly speaking, they argue that chronically ill patients are especially vulnerable to epistemic injustice, with the result that these patients are at risk of suffering both epistemic harms as well as negative health outcomes. I will focus on cases that involve testimonial exchanges between healthcare providers and chronically ill patients, showing why identifying epistemic injustice in these cases is problematic. As I argue, for their approach to be successful, it must be possible to determine when an epistemic injustice has occurred. By discussing a range of cases, I will show that it is generally not possible to distinguish between genuine versus merely apparent cases of epistemic injustice. Indeed, in some cases it is unclear whether patients suffer specifically epistemic harms even if we grant that other injustices have occurred. I thus conclude that the appeal to the concept of epistemic injustice has no clear explanatory value in these encounters.