Session: Ethical Issues in Reproductive and Fertility Care
How to Discuss the Non-Identity Problem
Saturday, October 14, 2023
1:15 PM – 2:30 PM ET
Location: Dover C (Third Floor)
Care ethicist Eva Feder Kittay has contended that many philosophers argue for the permissibility of selective reproductive procedures in a way that “reinforces the stigma that disabled people bear” and has titled her chapter about this “How Not to Argue for Selective Reproductive Procedures.” In response, I will suggest best practices for discussing the non-identity problem. While it may be impossible to fully close the gap between the medical model or limited definitions of disability that most philosophers accept and the social model of disability championed by disability activists, there is substantial opportunity to improve the discourse and avoid deepening the stigma around disability. When discussions of the non-identity problem begin with a comparison of both objective and subjective understandings of well-being, and learners come to appreciate why both categories are relevant, they are equipped not only to understand the non-identity problem better, but also encouraged to understand disability as a human variation consistent with human flourishing and the good life sought by all. Next, by discussing both what the social model brings to this discussion and what it is unable to explain, it is possible to discuss disability in a way that is both less harmful and more accurate. I will conclude by considering Julian Savulescu’s wheel of fortune thought experiment as a test case to consider what is and isn’t helpful interaction on this topic.