The concept of autonomy is central to liberal social and political morality, and indispensable in many areas of bioethics. A significant methodological challenge arises from the fact that the concept of autonomy plays several distinct roles (Arpaly 2003: 117-130; G. Dworkin 1988: 6; Feinberg 1986: 27-51; Vargas 2006). This raises an important question. Is there a single concept of autonomy of which philosophers develop distinct conceptions? Or is the situation better understood as one in which there are a variety of distinct concepts, all of which have come to be associated with the label “autonomy”? My aim in this paper is to develop the second interpretation. Somewhat more ambitiously, I sketch the outlines of a pluralistic account of autonomy concepts, the goal of which is to clarify what the most common and central autonomy concepts are, and how they function—that is, what work they do—in our ethical lives. The central concepts are: (i) responsibility-entailing freedom, (ii) authenticity, (iii) independence of mind, and (iv) self-sovereignty. I begin by showing that these concepts are not the same. Next, I briefly sketch a naturalistic and functional account of their origins: the natural facts about our psychology and sociality in virtue of which (i) – (iv) are important for creatures like us. Finally, I return to the challenge mentioned at the outset and argue that we ought to be autonomy pluralists.